Author Archives | Vitaliy Katsenelson

Is Burlington Northern a Blunder for Buffett?

Is Burlington Northern a Blunder for Buffett?

I have tremendous respect for Mr. Buffett. But every word that comes out of his mouth should not be looked upon as prophecy, or the gospel truth. I get a feeling that Buffett has been canonized into a value investor saint – investors and the media worship the ground he walks on and the air he breathes. The media are unable to get any critical quotes from his investors, and nobody wants to be caught disagreeing with the Oracle of Omaha – after all he’s been right more often than wrong – and so we only get positive puff pieces. On the rare occasion when Berkshire Hathaway stock declines more than the market, you see an article asserting that “Buffett has lost his magic touch,” but these articles are usually followed by stellar performance by Berkshire. Though Buffett deserves admiration – he is brilliant and likable and he has achieved incredible returns for his investors over the last half-century – he should not be canonized, and not everything he does or says is the ultimate truth.

Most investors agree with Buffett’s criticism of Kraft’s decision to buy a fairly valued (or overvalued) Cadbury at 22 times earnings (over the past 15 years, its average price-to-earnings ratio has been 21), using Kraft’s undervalued stock. Cadbury runs a global, noncyclical confectionary business that, if properly managed, should have a very high return on capital. Buffett, a shareholder of Kraft, was very public about his dismay – he said he felt poorer when Cadbury accepted Kraft’s increased offer.

But though many agree with Mr. Buffett’s assessment of the Kraft/Cadbury deal, investors and media are completely ignoring Berkshire’s own, $30-billion-plus acquisition of a very cyclical, capital-intensive, not terrifically high-return-on-capital business – Burlington Northern. A railroad for which Mr. Buffett’s Berkshire will lay out 18 times earnings (over last 15 years its average P/E was 15); and to make it even worse, part of the deal will be financed by issuing what Buffett recently called “cheap” Berkshire stock. Burlington stock is not cheap, it is fairly priced at best, and likely overpriced. Also, Buffett owning Burlington Northern will not make the railroad business any more valuable. There is little value to be unlocked in this business, and Buffett will practice his usual hands-off approach.

Though Mr. Buffett said all the right words – “I am betting on the recovery of the US economy” – there are some rays of hypocrisy shining through Buffett’s statements about other companies (e.g., Kraft) and his own actions. He felt “poorer” when Kraft made the acquisition – well, BRK’s shareholders should feel poorer, too.

Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA, is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver, Colo. He is the author of Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets (Wiley Finance).To receive Vitaliy’s future articles my email, click here.

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Posted in The Trade, Trading2 Comments

More Government in the Financial Sector Will Save Capitalism

More Government in the Financial Sector Will Save Capitalism

I am a Capitalist Pig, and proud of it. Thus, you would not expect me to support government interference and more strenuous regulation of financial institutions – after all, capitalism (free markets) and tight regulation don’t mix well. Well, at the risk of been kicked out of the Capitalistic Pig Party, I am in support of tighter regulation of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) institutions – the likes of Citigroup, JPMorgan, Bank America, and (God forbid; after all, they are doing “God’s work” – their CEO’s words, not mine) Goldman Sachs.

Lack of tight regulation in the TBTF space leads to the worst economic system of all: asymmetric socialism. The enormous gains are reaped by employees and shareholders, but losses are socialized and paid by taxpayers. That is simply immoral.

Letting companies fail is at the core of capitalism’s DNA, and I still stand by that. However, what we’ve discovered over the last few years is that if we let TBTF banks go bankrupt, their failure may take down other healthy (interlinked) financial institutions
and derail the real (nonfinancial) economy. We saw glimpses of that about to happen when Lehman went bankrupt. If the government hadn’t stepped in to guarantee money-market funds (and almost everything else on earth), the real economy would have stopped in a few days, with massive withdrawals of funds from money markets and a shutdown of the commercial paper market, which in turn would cut off healthy companies like IBM from regular day-to-day activities like financing their inventories and paying their employees.

Our financial system operates on the assumption of continuity: we assume tomorrow will arrive and that we’ll be able to get our money out of the banks if we want to. A failure of large financial institutions is akin to an earthquake of magnitude 9 on the Richter scale taking place in NY, but with aftershocks of 7 magnitude ripping throughout the country; and at the end of the day (or the week) the whole country ends up in ruin.

I could be wrong, and the failure of a large bank might end up being not such a significant event, but we will NEVER find out, as the cost of being wrong is too high. So we end up with the imperfect world we live in – the big banks will not be allowed to
fail.

This imperfect world leads us to two realistic solutions: (a) create incredibly strenuous regulations that will require significantly higher equity-to-debt ratios than for smaller banks and severely restrict the activities of TBTF institutions. Basically, they need to be turned into regulated utilities, like your local gas and water companies. Permit their “God’s work” to be limited to only very transparent traditional banking activities – so they cannot fail. Separate the leveraged hedge fund (the proprietary trading operation) and the bank (the institution that takes deposits and makes loans). In other words, bring back a more sophisticated version of Glass Steagall act.

Or we have option (b): break them up, either by making their lives unbearable through the strenuous regulation described in option (a), or simply by legislating it, as was done with AT&T in the 1980s.

There are upsides and downsides with each solution. I personally believe regulations of complex systems often fails, as Wall Street always figures out how to game the system. Fannie and Freddie had a single regulator, OFHEO, whose sole job was to insure their viability. That didn’t work out well. Of course Fannie and Freddie also had a conflicting goal: they had to report to HUD that they were providing enough financing to low-income households. (Canada, on the other hand, is dominated by just a handful of very large banks that are strenuously regulated and were almost unscathed by the recent financial crisis.)

Breaking them up is what makes the most sense to me. Break them into small enough pieces that their failure becomes a non-event for the economy as a whole. That way failure will not be socialized, but borne by those who were to reap the rewards, rather than your regular Joe and Jane Six-Pack having to fork over a chunk of their paychecks to “bail out” the TBTFs so they can keep their jobs.

Intense regulation of TBTF institutions will slow economic growth, but to its natural, sustainable level. As we have learned, the other type of growth, though fun for a while, has a price tag that only increases with time.

Regulation may even stiffen innovation. I love innovation; I buy anything that has an “i” in front of it – I may even buy Apple’s iPad. But Wall Street and our economy as a whole would have been better off if, over the last decade, Wall Street was less “innovative” and employed fewer mathematicians with PhDs. Their latest & greatest innovations – the financial products that through sophisticated, ingenious, mind-boggling formulas (that often lacked common sense) showed their bosses how to create higher financial leverage on top of already high financial leverage – were
responsible for the bombs that were at the heart of many recent blowups.

Breaking up TBTF will face the criticism that smaller banks will be less efficient and thus borrowing costs will be higher for consumers and corporations. This would be true if TBTF banks did not come with marble conference rooms, million-dollar executive offices, fleets of corporate jets, and $100-million compensation packages. The bottom line, if you compare the financial metrics: smaller banks are not any less efficient than the large ones.

A greater government involvement in the financial sector is not something I thought I’d ever ask for, but it has turned into a necessity in order to preserve, not destroy, capitalism.

Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA, is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver, Colo. He is the author of Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets (Wiley Finance).To receive Vitaliy’s future articles my email, click here.

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Posted in Economy, Featured, The Scoop0 Comments

Chinese Quest for Shortcut to Greatness

Chinese Quest for Shortcut to Greatness

The Chinese economy must be getting out of control, because the Chinese government is doing the unthinkable: It is desperately trying to put the brakes on the economy. When you pump a stimulus package that represents 14% of GDP through a fire hose into an economy, which was already on shaky bubble foundation, in a very short time you’ll have some serious unintended consequences — you’ll get super bubbles.

To understand what’s taking place in China today, we need to rewind the clock about a decade. At that time the Chinese government chose a policy of growth at any cost. To achieve that, it kept its currency (the renminbi) at artificially low levels against the dollar — this helped already cheap Chinese-made goods become even cheaper than its competitors’. The US and global consumers were eager to buy them. China turned into a significant exporter to the US. Normally, if free-market economic forces were at work, the renminbi would have appreciated and the US dollar would have declined. However, if China let its currency appreciate, its exports would have become more expensive and the demand for Chinese products would have declined, and its economy wouldn’t have grown at 10% a year.

But China isn’t your local democracy, and it needed to grow at any cost. So instead, through the government-controlled banking system, China accumulated a couple trillion dollars of foreign reserves in US dollars and euros. This had an unintended consequence: It helped keep US interest rates at very low levels, and lent a friendly hand in the financing of a huge consumption binge by the US consumer (i.e., China’s largest customer).

The more China sold to the US, the more dollars it accumulated, and thus the more US Treasuries it bought, driving our interest rates down. The US consumer was in turn happy to leverage its future (through the “always” appreciating asset, its house) and delighted to consume cheap Chinese-made goods. (I’m not dismissing the role in what took place of many other factors, like lack of financial regulation; missteps by rating agencies, the Fed, and politicians; securitization; etc., but I don’t want to steal the spotlight from China).

This symbiotic match made in heaven between China and the US consumer worked great as long as housing prices kept rising and the financial machine kept multiplying dollars. But all good things come to an end, and great things come to an end with a bang. The financial meltdown erupted upon us, the US and global banks started dropping like flies … well, you know how that story played out.

So now let’s fast forward a year. Today the global economy is stabilizing, thanks to Uncle Sam and various other “uncles” around the world. But the consumers of Chinese-made goods are overleveraged and now deleveraging, unemployment is high, the banks have got religion and aren’t lending, and there’s not much demand for loans anyway (except from the US government).

Despite this, the Chinese export-based economy, a manufacturer to the world, has clocked growth of 8.7% in 2009. The rest of the world looks at the Chinese growth miracle with envy; it seems that China has got economics figured out. But don’t hurry to trade your democracy for an authoritarian system. The Chinese grass is not as green as it appears. First, China lies. One shouldn’t believe all the economic numbers that are put out by the Chinese government. This is the government that magically managed to report 6% to 8% GDP growth in the midst of the financial crisis, when its exports were down more than 25%, tonnage of goods shipped through its railroads was down by double digits, and its electricity consumption was falling like a rock. It’s hard to manufacture 8% more widgets with a lot less electricity, and no, China didn’t suddenly become energy-efficient during the financial crisis: Electricity consumption rebounded in a few months once the stimulus kicked in.

Despite reported rosy GDP growth, the Chinese economy was contracting during the economic crisis. But don’t be surprised, this is a government that will go to great lengths to maintain appearances to keep its ideology going.

Second, China will do anything to grow its economy, as the alternatives will lead to political unrest. A lot of peasants moved to the cities in search of higher-paying jobs during the go-go times. Because China lacks the social safety net of the developed world, unemployed people aren’t just inconvenienced by the loss of their jobs, they starve (this explains the high savings rate in China) and hungry people don’t complain, they riot. Once you look at what’s taking place in the Chinese economy through that lens, the decisions of its leaders start making sense, or at least become understandable.

Unlike Western democracies, where central banks can pump a lot of money into the financial system but can’t force banks to lend or consumers and corporations to spend, China can achieve both at lightning speed. The Chinese government controls the banks, thus it can make them lend, and it can force state-owned enterprises (one-third of the economy) to borrow and to spend. Also, because the rule of law and human and property rights are nascent in its economic and political system, China can spend infrastructure project money very fast — if a school is in the way of a road the government wants to build, it becomes a casualty for the greater good.

China has spent a tremendous amount of money on infrastructure over last decade and there are definitely long-term benefits to having better highways, fast railroads, more hospitals, etc. But government is horrible at allocating large amounts of capital, especially at the speed it was done in China. Political decisions (driven by the goal of full employment) are often uneconomical, and corruption and cronyism result in projects that destroy value.

Infrastructure and real estate projects are where you get your biggest bang for the buck if your goal is to maintain employment, because they require a lot of unskilled labor; and this is where in the past a lot of Chinese money was spent. This also explains why, in 2009, new floor space constructed was up 100% and residential real estate prices surged 25%. And this explains why they keep building skyscrapers even though the adjacent ones are still vacant. To make things worse, before the financial crisis and enormous stimulus, China was already suffering from what I call late-stage-growth obesity, inefficiencies that are a byproduct of high growth rates sustained for a long period of time. Though Chinese growth in the past was high, in its late stages the quality of growth has been low.

For example, in an echo of past Chinese government asset-allocation decisions, China built the largest shopping mall in the world, the South China Mall, which is 99% vacant years after construction. China also built a whole city, Ordos, in Inner Mongolia, on spec for one million residents who never appeared.

The inefficiencies are also evident in industrial overcapacity. According to Pivot Capital, Chinese excess capacity in cement is greater than the combined consumption by the US, Japan, and India combined. Also, Chinese idle production of steel is greater than the production capacity of Japan and South Korea combined. Similarly disturbing statistics are true for many other industrial commodities. The enormous stimulus amplified problems that already existed to financial-crisis levels. China is a less shiny but more drastic version of Dubai.

There is speculation that the Chinese consumer will pick up the demand slack for the US and European consumers who are deleveraging and buying fewer Chinese-made goods. This may happen, but it will take decades. The US and European consumers are two-thirds of much larger economies. The Chinese consumer is only one-third of the Chinese economy, and its purchasing power is significantly undermined by the undervalued renminbi.

We look at China and are mesmerized by its 1.3 billion people, its achievements of the last decade, its recent economic resiliency, and its ability to achieve spectacular results on the fly. But we have to remember that economic bubbles are usually just a good thing taken too far. This was the case with railroads in the US in the late 19th century: The railroads were supposed to change the landscape of the US, and they did, but that didn’t prevent a lot of them from going out of business first and investors losing money. The Internet was supposed to change how we communicate, and it did, but in the process it generated a tremendous bubble, followed by the loss of wealth for many. The Chinese economy is no exception. Its long-term future may be bright, but in the short run we’ve got a bubble on our hands.

Everyone wants a shortcut to greatness, but there isn’t one. It would be great if the word (economic) cycle only existed in a singular form, and the only cycle we had in the economy was happy expansion. If there were no cycles, there would be no painful recessions. But as heaven couldn’t exist without hell, or capitalism without failure, economic expansion can’t exist without recession. China has been trying to bend the laws of economics for awhile, and with the control it exerts over its economy it may seem, at least for a short while, that the laws of economics work differently in China. But this is only a temporary mirage, which must be followed by huge pain and drastic consequences. No, there’s no shortcut to greatness, in anything, not in politics, not in personal life, not in economics.

P.S. The last paragraph on “shortcuts to greatness” doesn’t just apply to China (though China, through much greater control of its economy, took it to a new level); it applies to the US, Europe, and Japan as well. Over the last several decades our respective governments intervened in free markets and actively tried to manage the business cycle – only expansions, or just mild recessions – and for this we are paying today.

Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA, is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver, Colo. He is the author of Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets (Wiley Finance).To receive Vitaliy’s future articles my email, click here.

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Posted in Economy, The Scoop0 Comments

The Case for Pfizer

The Case for Pfizer

I understand why investors don’t want to own Pfizer (PFE); there is little excitement in the stock:

• It is down significantly from the Viagra-high it reached in 1998. Yes, Pfizer is the maker of Viagra, the drug that spawned a slew of commercials that made TV unwatchable (especially if you have little kids who ask you if they or you need this medicine that makes people on TV hug each other, or ask you “What is reptile dysfunction?”).

• Pfizer’s earnings have not gone anywhere for years.

• As with almost anything medical-related, Pfizer is exposed to the political risks of Washington DC.

• Finally, it is facing patent expirations of its major blockbuster drugs like Lipitor ($12 billion of sales) and a few others that will hinder PFE’s future growth for years.

There is not much one can do about TV commercials except cancel cable or watch less TV (I did both). Nor there is not much one can do about the stock-price decline over the last ten years – maybe the only thing to do is learn not to buy hype; after all, Pfizer was trading at over 50 times earnings in the late ’90s.

I don’t want to dismiss the political risk, but it seems that due to extensive lobbying efforts by pharmaceutical companies, political risk has turned into only a slight inconvenience. Pharma companies have agreed to $80 billion of price concessions over the next ten years, but at the same time they’ll benefit from a larger customer base, as more people will have access to health insurance.

Instead of being mesmerized by huge drug expirations, we can do the value-investor kind of thing – estimate the impact of drug expirations on PFE’s cash flows and value the stock using discounted cash-flow analysis based on these assumptions.

So let’s value Pfizer:

No New Drugs Scenario: At the end of 2009 Pfizer acquired Wyeth (WYE), a large pharmaceutical company. I’ll address this very important acquisition in a bit, but first, let’s look at Pfizer on a pre-Wyeth basis. The fewer optimistic assumptions we use, the less likely the future will disappoint us. Applying this logic, let’s assume that soon after a drug-patent expiration, as the generic version hits the market, revenue from that compound declines 90% and stays at that level indefinitely. So, for instance, Lipitor’s revenues would drop off from around $12 billion to $1.2 billion after its patents expire in 2011.

Let’s also assume that the $8 billion Pfizer spends on R&D is completely wasted, and that over the next 5 years Pfizer will not come up with a single new drug. We estimated and discounted Pfizer’s cash flows over next five years. Based on these assumptions , it is worth about $15-18 a share. The difference in this range is accounted for mostly by assuming various inflation rates (price increases) on existing drugs.

Wyeth Acquisition Was a Stroke of Genius: Pfizer took advantage of the financial market meltdown when it offered to buy Wyeth in the spring of 2009. PFE paid $60 billion for a company with earnings of about $4.5 billion, or about 13 times earnings. This is a very attractive price, considering that historically acquisitions in this industry have been done at much, much higher valuations (i.e., P/Es in the high teens and low twenties).

There are plenty of redundancies between the two companies in manufacturing, sales force, etc., so Pfizer is expected to save $4 billion on cost redundancies in three years, but even if costs savings are half what Pfizer expects, earnings power of the combined entity has increased by $6.5 billion ($4.5 billion from WYE’s earnings and $2 billion from cost savings). In other words, Pfizer’s actual acquisition valuation of Wyeth was less than 10 times earnings – incredibly cheap!

It Gets Better: Pfizer bought an asset (Wyeth with added cost savings) that had an earnings yield (the inverse of the P/E of 10) of 10% and financed a third of it with stock, a third with debt issuance, and the rest with its own cash. Though PFE’s stock was undoubtedly cheap (not an ideal currency for acquisition), billions of dollars of cash on its balance sheet were earning the company almost nothing; also, it was able to issue debt with an after-tax cost close to 4%. This combination of Wyeth’s bargain-basement purchase price and advantageous financing has created about $4 a share of value for Pfizer’s shareholders.

I have to admit, at first I was skeptical of the Wyeth acquisition – $60 billion is a lot of money, even for Pfizer; and historically, huge acquisitions have rarely solved companies’ problems or created shareholder value, in large part because companies overpaid for their targets, but that is not the case here.

The Bottom Line Is This: If Pfizer (including Wyeth) doesn’t come up with a single new drug, after spending $11 billion on R&D (Wyeth spent $3 billion a year), Pfizer’s stock is worth between $19-22 a share, based on discounted cash-flow analysis.

New Drugs Are Free: Drug discovery is not a linear process – serendipity, perseverance, and financial might are the essential ingredients required for success in this costly endeavor. Pfizer has the latter two; the first one is an act of God kind of thing. But we are not buying this stock and praying: Pfizer has 100 drugs under development, 25 of which are in late-stage (phase 3) trials. Wyeth has an additional few dozen drugs in the pipeline, as well as 7 drugs in late-stage trials.

I have no idea what drugs will be successful, but I don’t have to because, first of all, we are not paying for them, since today’s stock price discounts no new drugs. Second, though it is human nature to believe that “Everything that can be invented has been invented,” as (a fictional) patent office official believed when he submitted his resignation in the late 1800s, that is unlikely to be the case.

Here Is How We Look at Pfizer: Pfizer also fits the profile of a stock that should do well in our steroidally challenged economy, as its revenues are unaffected by economic cyclicality. In case of inflation it has significant pricing power to pass cost increases to consumers (yes, and even the government). In case of deflation it should be able to maintain prices, and its ample cash flows will allow Pfizer to pay off its debt in a few years, if it chooses to. It is priced like a very safe bond with an embedded nonexpiring, free call option, yielding 4%. If Pfizer doesn’t come up with a single new drug its price will not change much; it will be where it is today. Any new drugs are just an added bonus.

Disclosure: Author Owns Shares of Pfizer.

Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA, is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver, Colo. He is the author of Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets (Wiley Finance).To receive Vitaliy’s future articles my email, click here.

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Posted in Earnings, The Trade0 Comments

IMS Health is Being Stolen

IMS Health is Being Stolen

IMS HealthIt was announced Thursday that IMS Health was to be stolen from its shareholders for $4 billion or about $22 share; a private equity firm will buy them out. IMS Health should have free cash flows this year over $340 million (the actual number should be higher than $400 million, but is benefited by a $60 million onetime tax benefit).

So this company, which has virtually no competition, has barriers to entry impossible for a new entrant to overcome, and a cash printing machine will be sold for about 12 times free cash flows. Over the past year we’ve seen much lower quality companies being sold for much higher valuations than this. Most recently, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, which has a significant competitive advantage but has far inferior return on capital and free cash flow generation than IMS, is to be purchased by Mr. Buffett for about 20 times earnings and 30 or more times free cash flows. IMS Health’s management and board have a history of making dumb capital allocation decisions, but this one may go down in history as their dumbest.

We own these shares and will probably hold on to them in the hope that shareholders will refuse this offer.

Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA, is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver, Colo. He is the author of Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets For more information click here.RXStocks

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Posted in The Trade, Trading 1010 Comments


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